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The New External Action Service of the EU: 
 A European Diplomatic Entity in the making? 
 
Natividad Fernández Sola
1  
 
1.Introduction: the roots of the current situation for the EU international representation 
 
2. Proposals by the Constitutional European Convention, a path forward 
  2.1. A European Foreign Affairs Ministry 
  2.2. The Embassies of the EU 
  2.3. A European Diplomatic School? 
 
3. The Treaty of Lisbon and its ambiguity 
  3.1. Pros and cons of the formula adopted 
  3.2. Difficulties for its implementation 
  3.3. Relationship with national diplomatic services 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
 
 
1.INTRODUCTION: THE ROOTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION FOR THE EU 
INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATION 
The Treaty of the European Union, when entering into force the Lisbon reform, will include a 
new article 27.3 according to which 
“In fulfilling his mandate, the High Representative shall be assisted by a European 
External Action Service. This service shall work in cooperation with the diplomatic 
services of the Member States and shall comprise officials from relevant 
departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission as well 
as staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the Member States. The 
organization and functioning of the European External Action Service shall be 
established by a decision of the Council. The Council shall act on a proposal from 
the High Representative after consulting the European Parliament and after 
obtaining the consent of the Commission” 
 
This article shows the will to improve the unitarian and coherent international action of the 
European Union from the situation at present. 
        As  it  is  well  known,  the  current  EU international representation could be triple: by the 
Commission, by the Council (Mr. CFSP and the Presidency) and by Member States; situation that 
reflects the institutional complexity and the partial integration of the EU. According to the 
original Treaties, the Commission had the monopole for international representation. The most 
visible result of this representation were the Commission offices and delegations in 123 countries 
and 5 international organizations (OCDE in Paris, OSCE in Vienna, UN in Geneva –including 
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WTO-, New York, Paris, Vienna, Rome –FAO- and Nairobi). The Commission has its own 
RELEX service. The role of these delegations (Art. 20 TEU), jointly with diplomatic missions of 
Member States, is to cooperate in order to assure the respect and application of the common 
positions and common actions adopted by the Council. 
        But the development of the EPC since 1970 implied a parallel and de facto international 
representation by the rotating Presidency of the Council, which leads to the establishment of a 
permanent Secretariat at the Council outside the communitarian institutional structure. 
Immediately it was clear the lack of continuity due to the rotation of the Presidency and then an 
informal troika was established, but it didn’t cope with the lack of political weight in international 
negotiations. 
        The  Maastricht  Treaty  integrated  into the Treaties the new CFSP, with an apparent 
institutional unity. The Treaty as modified by the Amsterdam treaty, sets up the High 
Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (art.18.3) who assist to the Council in 
CFSP issues, in particular by its contribution to the preparation and implementations of political 
decisions and eventually, on behalf of the Council, addressing political dialogue with third 
countries (art.26). 
         These innovations had as consequence the institutionalization of common foreign policy 
and more visibility of the EU international representation in political issues, even the re-
formulation by some Member States of their foreign policies (phenomenon of the 
Europeanization of foreign policies) and the harmonization of divergent interests and positions of 
these member states. The HR has its own cabinet and counts on the Polity Unit as well as the 
Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. EU Military Staff is under the authority of the HR as 
well. 
                  Under these conditions, the HR represents the continuity of the CFSP even if it is 
considered to have a low political representation as its legitimacy flows from the Council. There 
are in practice some examples of lack of coherence between external action from European 
Commission acting under the first pillar and the Council acting under the second one. Situations 
often solved by the good will and personal understanding between Mr. CFSP and RELEX 
Commission. 
         It  is  a polyedric  international  representation due the presence of two gravity centers in 
foreign policy. In total, specific human resources for external relations amount at 3000 people in 
headquarters and in external delegations
2, plus about 2000 people in Development issues and 
ACP relationship; about 150 in Humanitarian Assistance, 480 in Trade issues and 780 in 
Enlargement issues. 
          Moreover, to the aforementioned difficulties derived from the current organization, the EU 
has others because the lack of unitary presence in international forum and organizations, given 
the legal impossibility to become member or the lack of coordination of member states there 
represented. Even if the EU has tried hardly to impose an obligation to previous concerted efforts 
for an agreement (art.19 and 20 TEU) this is not a reality at present. 
          An example to take into account is the recent EU delegation before the African Union; first 
EU delegation under the responsibility of both, the Commission and the Council given the 
important role played by the EU (second pillar) in the Darfur mission
3. 
                                                           
     
2 See working document 6,  Working Group VII on EU institutions human capabilities for external action. 
     
3 Since the EU support to AMIS en 2005 supporting AU (Council common action 2005/557, 20/VII/2005). 
Currently, the EU maintain in the area the civilian operation EUPOL RD Congo (Council common action 
2007/405/CFSP, 12/VI/2007 on EU Police mission on  the field of RSS and its connection with justice in DRC, 
modified by common action 2008/485/CFSP,  23/VIII), and the military one EUSEC RD Congo (Council common 
action 2008/491/CFSP, 26/VI/2008 modifying common action 2007/406/CFSP on the assistance and support EU 
mission on SSR in DRC).  Also, in the FYROM, the EU has a joint representation, because the Commission office 
opened in March 2000, has hosted the Council, due to the double condition of Ambassador Erwan Fouéré as EU special 
representative and Head of the European Commission Delegation.   
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Another example of joint presence took place during the war in Georgia (August-September 
2008) with a joint visit to Moscow by the President of the European Council, the President of the 
Commission and the HR. The delegation obtained the agreement of Russian Presidency on a 
Peace agreement and the consent for an EU observer mission. Probably the success of a unique 
representation has to be found in a hard and strong Presidency like the French one. 
         This is the complex current situation and the European Convention, as well as IGC for the 
Constitutional Treaty and for the Lisbon Treaty, outlined the need for an external action effective 
and coherent and so the legal and institutional tools for it. The treaty of Lisbon is clearly oriented 
to this aim. Even if a new HR like the one foreseen at the treaty is not an automatic solution for 
the lack of coherence of EU external action and the will of the member states is also needed, it is 
a first step in this direction. The will of the States would generate easier by a close association 
with the HR and with an External Action Service that counts on national diplomats and reports 
some positive effect for them. 
 
2. PROPOSALS MADE BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL EUROPEAN CONVENTION: A 
PATH FORWARD 
 
Here we can find the proposals made by the Convention, mainly by the working group “external 
relations” but also by the WG on international personality and defense, and collected at the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, as well as the content of the Joint Report by the HR and 
the President of the Commission. One of these proposals was the creation of a semi-permanent 
Presidency for the European Council.  Some representative considered that it doesn’t count on 
parliamentary control and would add another actor for EU external representation and increase 
bureaucratic rivalries among all of them
4. 
 
2.1. A European Foreign Affairs Ministry 
It is the main innovation (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, in ToL, art.18 TEU) and result from the unsatisfactory situation because the lack of 
coherence between the external action of RELEX Commissioner and the HR. To arrive to this 
result four options were available: 
- To keep the current situation but increasing the cooperation between RELEX 
Commissioner and the HR, both with separate functions 
- The merger of both under the aegis of the Commission; in fact it would consist on the 
integration of the HR into the organizational structure of the Commission 
- The merger of both in one person (double hat) gathering the functions of both but 
keeping separate procedures for first or second pillar actions (personal union) 
- Creation of an EU Foreign Affairs Ministry, under the authority of the semi-permanent 
European Council President, merging both roles. For the Service supporting the new Ministry, 
there were two possibilities: to create a joint Service with officers from the Commission DG 
RELEX and from the Council Secretariat supported by national diplomatic services members, or 
to maintain two different and separate administrative bodies and a joint private office for the 
Foreign Affairs Ministry to guarantee the coordination between both. 
The choice for the third formula will imply that only one person assume the responsibilities till 
now in the hands of the HR and of the RELEX Commissioner, even by the President of the 
                                                           
       
4 E. Brok, Working Group VII, working document 26, 4781, “The External Representation of the European 
Union”, y Brok, van der Linden, Cushnahan y Lamassoure, working document 46, 5331. For these EP 
Representatives  –excepction of Van der Linden from Dutch Parliament– the HR has to merge with 
RELEX Commissioner into the Framework of the Commission and the resulting one has to preside the 
External Relations Council.  
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External Relations Council, even if the Foreign Affairs Ministry wouldn’t have a right to vote in 
the Council
5. 
        If in the framework of the WG there were different approaches on these four possibilities, 
there were also a considerable consensus in favor of the creation of a joint service with officers 
from the Commission DG RELEX and the Council Secretariat supported by national diplomatic 
services members, for a European Diplomatic School and for a EU diplomatic service working 
alongside with national Embassies. The main opposition came from the German Government 
Representative, who argued that if the competences of both services are separate, the respective 
administrative apparatus must be kept separate too, and proposed on the side of the Council, the 
settlement of a European Unit for Foreign Policy regrouping the current UPPAR, the Centre of 
Situation, the Council DG External Relations and officers from member states and from the 
Commission (sic)
6. The Constitutional Treaty and the ToL propose the creation of an EEAS for 
the support of the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
 
  2.2. The Embassies of the EU 
The unique international legal personality attributed to the EU by the ToL is essential to 
consolidate a unique international representation by the new HR assisted by a new unitary 
External Action Service. It appears clearly the nonsense to keep the current European 
Commission Delegations in third countries. So, the Convention recommended to the IGC to 
substitute them for EU delegations or embassies. The term “embassy” was immediately rejected 
and the ToL foresees EU Delegations (art.221 Treaty of Functioning of the UE) that have to 
works once the Treaty enters into force. 
        The idea of EU Embassies was more ambitious looking for a unitary image of the Union in 
third countries. Useful in third countries where member states were not represented or under-
represented, the EU Embassies must allow to gather the existent national embassies and offer a 
place for cooperation and assistance to member states. So that, respecting the diplomatic 
autonomy of the member states, EU embassies would allow increasing the European presence and 
influence in third countries, as well as the preparation on joint diplomatic initiatives and so on.
7 
 
  2.3. A European Diplomatic School? 
Once accepted the establishment of an EEAS, a further step would be the coordination of the 
training programs for officers to belong to this Service as well as the settle of a European 
Diplomatic School. 
In general, there is no doubt on the good training of national diplomats. However and with 
notable exceptions this is not the rule for officers from RELEX DG Commission or Council 
Secretariat given their mobility between different DG, and not specifically devoted to external 
                                                           
       
5 See Brian Cowe, The European External Action Service: Roadmap for Success, Chatham House 
Report, 2008, p. 13, the most common is to refer to the two first functions.  Amendments made by Michel 
Barnier  to the revised text proposed by the European Convention (working document 59, doc. 6090) set off 
the lack of the voting right in the Council, what  stress its impartiality. The First Preliminary Draft Report 
(working document 21, doc.4726) didn’t refer to the merger of the existing  bodies.   
       
6 H. Martin Bury, Working Group VII, working document 53, doc.5584. In this vein opposed to the 
proposal, see the comments of P. Hain (working document 66, doc.6178) and B. Mc Donagh, (working 
document 16, doc.4450); G. Pleuger (working document 17, doc.4484) proponed the existente of two 
diffent support bodies, that was one of the proposals to be considered by the Project of revised final report 
(working document 21 REV1, doc.5573)   
      
7 “Towards the establishment of a common European diplomacy, paper by Mr. Iñigo Méndez de Vigo, 
member of the Convention”, Working Group VII, working document 55, 3/XII/2002, p. 5. In the same 
vein, the written Declaration according to article 116 of the European Parliament internal rules, by E. Brok, 
N. Fontaine, B. Geremek, J. Leinen e I. Méndez de Vigo, about a Foreign Policy, Security and Defense 
Union. PE 0010/2007, 31/I/2007    
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action or international representation, with the result of the need for the officers involved in EU 
external action to have a specific training. 
       On the other side, members of national diplomatic services are not prepared for defending 
EU interests but national interests and sovereignty. So, another kind of specific training is needed 
too. 
        The proposal made by the working group was gradual, going from a network of European 
diplomatic Schools coordinating training programs –mainly on European issues-
8, to a joint 
program under the responsibility of a European Diplomatic School, probably on the basis of the 
current experience and EDTI. 
                That proposal was not accepted by the Convention however it is not impossible that it 
becomes a reality given the spillover phenomenon if a new HR and its EEAS are created 
according to the ToL. Anyway, a very European diplomacy only can emerge from the organized 
convergence of the member states’ interests
9 
 
3. THE TREATY OF LISBON AND ITS AMBIGUITY 
 
According to the TEU, as reformed by the ToL, the EEAS will be composed by officers from the 
Commission and from the Council General Secretariat with the support of the national diplomatic 
services from member states (art. 27.3 TEU). 
         Preparatory works for the kick off of the EEAS started in 2004 but stopped after the failure 
of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005. After the signature of the ToL the work re-started counting 
on the cooperation of the Member States and the European Parliament with the Council and the 
Commission. The first (member states) preferred a Service with a balanced representation of EU 
officers and national diplomats avoiding to put apart national diplomatic services or duplicate 
them. The second (EP) wanted a Service incorporated into the organizational structure of the 
Commission.
10 After the negative referendum in Ireland and the impasse in the ratification 
process of the ToL, the preparatory works for an EEAS stopped again. We consider that it is 
legally possible and could be politically acceptable the creation or mise-à-jour of the HR even 
outside the constitutional or treaty framework. The same reasoning is applicable to the 
establishment of an EEAS for the HR assistance. The question is to choose an acceptable political 
moment, preferably medium-term it the Treaty of Lisbon is not immediately de-blocked. 
 
3.1. Pros and cons of the formula adopted 
As well as the new HR, the EEAS is a baroque exercise aiming to conciliate the external action of 
two different institutions in order to gain coherence.  Obviously, it implies a high degree of 
complexity in its organization and the design of its functioning in the future. 
       Its  composition  tries  to  reflect  an  institutional balance and needs further details. The 
appointment of its members requires the consent of the three main institutions. 
       The  acknowledgement  of  the  EU  Delegations requires an international representation 
according to the unique legal personality and with the aim to promote and improve the EU 
external action and its visibility. These external EU Delegations have to provide the EEAS an 
important added value if they have a good information system useful for the Commission, the 
Council and member states and if they have the economic resources for this. If Delegations count 
                                                           
     
8 Currently 17 national diplomatic schools and training diplomatic centers participate in European 
Diplomatic Training Initiative (EDTI), that offers its courses to national and European officers having in 
mind the perspective of a future EEAS. See European Diplomatic Training Initiative, 
http://www.diplomacy.edu/edti/.   
    
9 Amendements by P. Andreani to the revised final report project, Working Group VII, working 
document 72, doc. 6255.   
    
10 European Parliament Resolution on the institutional aspects of the European External Action Service, 
26/V/2005, JO C 117E/233.    
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on members who doesn’t belongs to the EEAS, i.e. those devoted to trade policy, the head of the 
Delegation will have to coordinate the activities of all its members. 
 
  3.2. Difficulties for its implementation 
The main challenge for the EEAS will be the efficiency in developing an autonomous policy and 
in coordinating the EU external action. It has to show enough dynamism and initiative but also 
provide itself with legitimacy and credibility before the European citizens, the member states and 
the Union institutions
11. As the ToL does not contain its specific organization, nor its working 
methods, it should be decided unanimously by the Council, previous HR proposal and the consent 
of the Commission. 
        Which are the main issues to be solved before the entry into function of the EEAS? It will 
concern its scope and size, its legal status, the system for rotation and promotion of the officers 
working in, its location, the training of its members and the organizational and budgetary 
dependence. 
 
-  Scope and size: 
The size of the EEAS will be flexible in order to achieve efficiency according to the changing 
needs. As an starting point, there are two different theories concerning the right composition for 
the External Service, or relevant departments to be into it. The minimalist theory
12 considers 
mainly the HR task to coordinate external action, so the EEAS will be limited to officers for DG-
E and Polity Unit from the Council and DG RELEX from the Commission, especially from 
Direction A and the platform for crisis. With this composition, the EEAS will assist the HR in 
foreign policy issues but not in trade or others into the exclusive or shared competence of the 
European Community. So, the EEAS will have as task the support on issues belonging to the 
second pillar.  In my opinion this is as nonsense as giving the EEAS only the task to assist in first 
pillar issues as the new HR is created for avoiding this radical separation between pillars, its work 
and its officers with the consequence of a non-uniform external projection. According to a 
maximalist theory, the EEAS would include a wider representation of the Commission including 
DG Development, Neighborhood, Humanitarian Assistance, Financial management of external 
programs and Enlargement. The understanding of the task of the HR it involves would require an 
External Service including departments that are managing the CFSP and ESDP, as well as 
geographical and thematic offices
13. Even the special representatives must be included. On the 
side of the Council Secretariat it would include, apart from DG E and Polity Unit, the Military 
Staff and the Situation Center. This is an enormous sensitive issue as it implies to share 
intelligence analysis, necessary for the Service to prevent crisis. If we accept as it is said in the 
Joint Report that duplicities have to be avoided, so the main part of the human resources of the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission involved in external action have to pass to EEAS. The 
choice for maximalist approach would pose the problem of the EEAS relationship with European 
Parliament that till now is covered by a personal representative of the HR for parliamentary issues 
and that would require a whole section responsible for the relationship with the Euro-
parliament
14. 
-         In close relation with the size of the EEAS and one of the more debated approaches is the 
requirement of some percents of participation for each institution, as it is well known the number 
                                                           
      
11 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008.   
      
12 S. Duke, “The Lisbon Treaty and External Relations”, EIPASCOPE 2008/1, p. 15.  Only some 
member states prefer this formula, Joint Progress Report de 2005 jointly presented by Javier Solana and 
J.M. Durão Barroso on June, 9, 2005 to the European Council.   
     
13 The HR and the President of the Commission, in its Report, prefer to include services managing CFSP 
and geographical and thematic departments, such as human Rights, counter-terrorism, non-proliferation or 
relationship with the UN, Joint Progress Report 2005, cit.   
     
14 See S. Duke, cit., p. 16 Joint Progress Report de 2005, cit.    
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of Commission officers is bigger than the number of officers at the Council. The problem could 
be slightly balanced by the participation of national diplomats whose role is not clearly defined 
already. How interpret this option for the EEAS composition?  Different interpretations of it have 
been made. On the one side, it would imply almost to empty Commission for human resources 
and a risk of intergovernmentalism of some policies whose external relations till now are 
managed in a pure community way. On the other side, member states consider that it would lead 
to an inacceptable weight of the Commission
15. The Commission supports a wide EEAS, but the 
Council considers that other more balanced formulas has to be studied even if they would accept 
the inclusion of all external services of the Commission except those in charge of Trade policy. A 
proposal to obtain the support of all member states could be an initial composition of 1000 
Commission officers, 200 from the Council and 2000 from member states that could reach 6000. 
Whatever will be the size of the Service and the number of Commission officers it seems 
necessary the implication of all geographical offices or those with clear involvement in external 
action will be at the disposal of the External Service as a condition for the efficiency of the 
assistance given to the HR, and of its good results will depend the legitimacy of it
16. In order to be 
realistic and pragmatic, the EEAS has to start its task with the current officers from both 
institutions and progressively fighting for a specific European professional profile. It would imply 
at the first time a big number of national diplomats and gradually a big attention to the own EU 
officers / belonging to the EU/ in a further step. A reciprocal confidence has to exist between both 
and it is only possible on the basis of a gradual harmonization of foreign policy positions favored 
by a “coordination reflex” and a common institutional culture generated by a continued joint 
practice. Most of the actors involved in the process do not consider appropriate the existence of 
institutional quotas, nor the national ones
17.  
-           So the institutional tradition of geographical equitative presence is broken out in order to 
guarantee the equality of all member states and the independence of Commission officers from 
any national interest. If there are no quotas how to recruit the personnel for EEAS? It must be 
based on the origin in a service in charge with some aspect of external relations or foreign policy 
and in the professional skills. How and by whom assess professional skills? The aim will be the 
excellence in the Service. So a specific procedure for national diplomats can be imagined if all 
officers from the Council and the Commission go to the EEAS, or a general procedure otherwise 
with the goal to offer to the HR the best support for the all range of his/her competences under the 
current 1
st or 2
nd pillars and for the all geographic or thematic issues in which the EU has 
competence. A general competition would be a formula, hardly acceptable for national diplomats 
who usually have past a national one. For that reason, most of the member states prefer to leave 
the selection of EEAS human resources in the hands of the ministers. Another more flexible 
formula would be the proposal by the Council, by the Commission and by the member states of 
the suitable candidates and their evaluation by a reduced body close to the HR giving priority to 
his opinion. So that there will be a selection at the first level and a final selection only among the 
previously selected giving this way the HR the discretionary power to compose a Service on the 
joint basis of competence, skills and personal trust. This procedure will probably reduce the 
struggle between Council and Commission and also between member states. Whatever will be the 
                                                           
      
15 Brian Cowe, cit., p. 15. Extremely  jealous on this point is the British House of Lords who consider 
essential the determination of the respective weight of each institution in the new Service to avoid a bigger 
power from the States to the Union; House of Commons, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, 
Third Report, 20/I/2008, Foreign Affairs Committee, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-
office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmfaff.htm, §179 y 182.   
      
16 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008   
       
17 The Council Report (External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008) 
refers only to a “overall regional balance without quotas”.  Joint Progress Report de 2005, cit., chose the 
same formula, so it remains undetermined how to make compatible this balance with the HR decision-
making for the election of people integrating the EEAS.     
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formula chosen the result would be very different if only applied to national diplomats or to 
everybody coming from the Council or the Commission external services. Also there will be 
differences between the procedure for the first appointment of the members of the Service and for 
the subsequent ones in order to cover specific vacancies; in this case an EEAS commission could 
do the job. 
                  Another problem is that of the promotion of the officers working for the EEAS. The 
mobility is desirable for a job in a delegation in a third country but for also for the rest of the 
Service would be appreciable a certain continuity that guarantees an “institutional memory”. How 
to balance both principles? Rotation or mobility and continuity? The solution could be a rotation 
between EEAS, diplomatic national services and external EU delegations and even national 
embassies in third countries. 
 
      EEAS Headquarters 
          A final solution to promote its autonomy and visibility would be an independent building in 
Brussels with antennas before the Secretariat Council and the Commission. Provisionally every 
officer could keep their current location and national diplomats being distributed between both. 
The most practical and less controversial solution is that the EEAS has the same location than the 
HR. 
 
      Training 
Even if the desideratum is a joint training by a European Diplomatic School, at present a 
minimum common training is needed. The success of the EEAS would be the result of a joint 
training, the knowledge of different national interests and different foreign policy traditions, it 
means, the result of a joint diplomatic culture essential for a feeling of “European public service” 
and for a “ European attitude” tackling with EU international relations. According to the Council, 
the EEAS training requires joint programs of diplomatic issues, exchanges of European and 
national officers, accelerated training for specific vacancies in third countries delegations
18. 
                There are currently two different programs at the EU that could be a useful basis and 
experience for the new EEAS: the Young Experts in Delegation  (YED, started in 1984) and 
Seconded National Experts in Delegations (2002). The aim of both is the training of young 
experts and officers from member states, respectively, in the European Community External 
Service. Since the first moment that an EEAS was proposed, both programs have improved its 
functions with a training approach for the future new Service. Even, the YED is colloquially 
called the “non-existing European Diplomatic School”.  
        Before to be sent to their destination, people participating in both programs receive intensive 
course of one month in Brussels to continue the training in the Delegations. In the last 3-4 years, 
both programs have been re-oriented in order to be a source of recruitment for the EEAS. It is 
quite probably that both will have, together with EU officers and temporary/contractual agents, a 
fundamental role in the future Service because they belongs to national administrations and have 
an intensive 2-year training in European External Service. 
        In a long-term perspective, EEAS members have to contribute to the training of the new 
members. The main task of this training apart from linguistic, diplomatic, leadership, 
representation or protocol skills, would be to generate a clear European identity to be promoted 
and defended by the HR and his/her EEAS. The European Parliament as well as the Council 
would accept to a long-term period the establishment of a European Diplomatic School with high 
training standards for the excellence of European diplomats.
19 
-  Organizational and budgetary dependence. 
                                                           
      
18 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008.   
      
19 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008.    
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        If European Parliament first considered appropriate its dependence from the Commission, 
the HR and the President of the Commission preferred its considerations as sui generis service as 
it is not a new institution but just a service for the support of the new HR
20. The second option 
seems to be the more suitable as the dependence from the Commission would contradict the 
required independence of the members of this institution. Concerning national diplomats, the 
question would be if they have to be temporary agents or détachés from their own national 
Administration. From the text of the ToL one can conclude the preference for détachés officers 
“staff seconded from national diplomatic services of the member states”. But most of the member 
states seems to prefer the temporary agents formula, option that I consider too the best as so that 
all EEAS members will have the same status and labor conditions.  
        So, we propose that officers from external relations DG from the Council and from the 
Commission have organizational dependence from their institutions and national diplomats 
seconding the service would be détachés, or even temporary agents if this would be the decision 
of national administrations. It would imply the same economic rules but perhaps different 
engagement/selection procedures of, in the case of national diplomats, different salaries that 
would harmonize gradually. The final EEAS composition, its acceptance and collaboration with 
member states will depend on the number and level of national diplomats present in it. After a 
first period, the EEAS would become and autonomous service from the Commission and the 
Council, a Service for the HR and depending on him/her. It is not already clear its budgetary 
dependence, however I consider it would be the same than the HR and come from Community 
budget because an agreement to share expenditure between member states would damage its 
impartiality. This way would allow European Parliament to have an indirect but important 
instrument to control the EEAS. 
 
      Scope of its competences: assistance to HR or also to the new European Council President? 
According to the ToL, the EEAS only serves as support of the HR. However there are relevant 
elements allowing us to think that it can also assist to the European Council President.
21 This 
would provide with more relevance to the EEAS and favors the coordination of the new President 
with the new HR; otherwise the risk of duplicity in representation and services, and by 
consequence of incoherence, is present again. Even it has been suggested the support from the 
EEAS to the Commission President and other members of the Commission in their international 
activities
22. But this would print and intergovernmental tendency against the suitable balance with 
the Commission. 
 
Future of the ToL and possibilities to create the HR and EEAS outside the constitutional 
framework. 
A paradigmatic case is the ESDP developed outside the framework of the Treaties by the political 
agreement of the member states. After starting at the very beginning of 1999 only the Treaty of 
Nice at the end of 2000 contains some references to the ESDP. Some bodies foreseen at the 
European Constitution became real without Constitution, like the EDA, the implementation of the 
solidarity clause or the generation of military capabilities
23.  
                                                           
      
20 See, European Parliament Resolution on the EEAS 2005, cit., and Joint Progress Report de 2005, 
cit., respectively.  
      
21 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008, and B. Cowe, cit., p. 
19.   
       
22 External Action Service, Contribution by Council Secretariat Officials, 2008, and Joint Progress 
Report de 2005, cit.   
      
23 Common action 551, 12/VII/2004, DO, nº L 245, 17/VII/2004, creates the European Defense 
Agency. Implementation of the solidarity clause by Declaration in the European Council Conclusions, 
March 25 and 26, 2004, (POLGEN 20, concl.1, 9048/04, de 19/V/2004) –Declaration on combating 
terrorism– after terrorists attacks in Madrid.    
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         This para-constitutional way is theoretically open to develop the most urgent tools to build a 
EU as an international global actor. However, politically it seems difficult given three negative 
referenda 
 
  3.3. Relationship with national diplomatic services,    
Two declarations included into the final act of the IGC of the ToL show the defensive member 
state attitude towards an increasing EU international representation. It state that the new HR and 
its EEAS will not affect the current competences of member states concerning the management of 
their foreign policy or their international representation, included their membership in 
international organizations, eventually SC of the UN membership. There are however two reasons 
for close cooperation between EEAS and national diplomatic services: the first is the requirement 
made by the ToL that national diplomats second the EEAS; the second is the provision of close 
cooperation and coordination between EU delegations under the HR and member states 
diplomatic and consular missions
24. 
        So, a clear definition of the respective task of national and European “diplomatic services” is 
needed. The philosophy of the Treaty is that the embryo of a European diplomacy will not 
damage to national diplomatic bodies. On the contrary, their experience and large setting out will 
be the main asset of the future Service. If national diplomats are included into the EEAS and 
national diplomatic services are necessary for the external representation, the fears and critics to 
the Service as a centralized one that will imply a transfer of power from member states to the EU 
institutions are nonsense
25. 
         It  has  been  suggested  that  the  new EU delegations have to assume as competence 
diplomatic and consular protection, civil protection, intervention in crisis situations and 
humanitarian assistance
26. The division of competences in these fields ought to be clear. The first 
explanation is that diplomatic protection is an exclusive state competence and consular protection 
could be offered, as is the current situation, by consular offices from other member states, even 
by the EU delegations if they count on national diplomats to do so. The EU delegations may 
assume the issuing of the visas, as it is a national competence but governed by communitarian 
rules. The only thing that member states would fear would be to loose the discretionary power 
they have currently to give or refuse to issue a visa. Member states have expressed their will to 
transfer to EEAS competences on visa and consular protection. 
         An  agreement  between  member  states to recognize that the head of the EU delegation 
preside the meetings of the national representatives in a third country would serve as a basis for 
the coordination of the activities of member state embassies
27. 
         The establishment of the EEAS doesn’t imply automatically a reduction of the national 
diplomatic services (the number of its members) but could help in this vein, except if the states 
use EEAS only to promote their national leadership inside the EU. As long as multilateral 
relations between member states are more important in a wide range of issues, traditional bilateral 
relations are less relevant. If it could be said that the controversy between bilateral diplomacy or 
diplomacy into the European framework is not a zero-sum game, whereas the political integration 
was not totally accomplished, the national Embassies will keep and even increase its role
28. The 
positive consequence of the EEAS institution has to be a better and more coordinated external 
representation of the Union, a more strength international actor and more visibility as such. 
                                                           
      
24 Articles 32 and 35 TEU, and 211 del Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.   
       
25 House of Commons, Foreign Policy Aspects of the Lisbon Treaty, Third Report, 20/I/2008, Foreign 
Affairs Committee, http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm/cmfaff.htm, §179.   
      
26 M. Barnier, “For a European civil protection force: Europeaid”, May, 2006.   
      
27 Joint Progress Report 2005, cit.   
      
28 Ø. Bratberg, “Bilateral Embassies in an Integrated Europe: a case of Institutional Robustness?”, 
European Integration, vol. 30, nº 2, 2008, pp.235-253.    
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4. Conclusions 
 
Most of the positive progress in external action, foreseen at the ToL, need a detailed development 
for which only member states and UE institutions have the responsibility. It is the case for the HR 
role with regard to the rest of the actors that play in the EU external relations, the EEAS design to 
assist the HR as well as that of the EU external delegations, or the way in which national 
diplomatic services can complement the EU action and vice versa. 
          The foreseen reforms on the EU external representation are in the way of producing a new 
governance code in the EU external action by the new European Council President, the new HR 
and the re-shape of the current semester Council presidency; changes that will demand for a new 
Service able to support all this framing. A new Service that will require: 
-  unity 
-  expertise and professionalization 
-  multiple sensibility and ability to determine common interests avoiding political views and a 
excessive weight of states and their diplomatic services but counting on them 
The new EEAS will imply that the traditional institutional logic of the representation of member 
states interests, citizens’ interests or of supranational interest would be substituted by a functional 
logic because the new Service has to take into account the EU interests inside of which national 
interests are included. If for a constructivist view, institutions can shape the agenda, identity and 
even transform the nature of the States (as a process of polity-building), in this case of the new 
EEAS, will mostly be the States which transform the very nature of formerly supranational 
institutions (Commission whose RELEX task is assumed by the new HR) creating a new style 
bodies, not “beyond the state” but “with the States”, by i.e. taking part in the EEAS. 
                More than a new policy beyond the State, the new EEAS as supporting the new HR 
represents a new kind of code for European Foreign Affairs Governance, in close cooperation 
with member states but avoiding traditional intergovernamentalism 
          Beyond this reasoning, would the EEAS creation have any impact on the nature of the EU 
as normative international power?
29 In this vein, two elements has to be taken into account. On 
the one side, having a unique international representation supported by a unique EEAS has to 
promote the EU normative power, its objectives, its resources and its results
30 as long as the 
external European action is founded on these common values. However, the presence of national 
diplomats in EEAS could imply to put apart these common values for the defense of individual 
national interests. This risk could be removed if one considers that national officers in the EEAS 
have to act not as such but to the service of the HR and for the EU interests. This behavior will be 
reinforced by a process of joint training and socialization at central EEAS headquarters in 
Brussels as well as at EU delegations in third countries. 
        So, the new EEAS will not produce per se a direct effect on the political integration process 
but will allow that any new development in this direction had an appropriate body to shape the 
EU external position and image. 
                                                           
       
29 T. Díez e I. Manners, “Reflecting in Normative Power Europe”, in F. Berenskoetter y M.J. Williams 
(eds.), Power in World Politics, Routledge, London, 2007, pp. 173-188.   
       
30 N. Tocci, “Profiling Normative Foreign Policy: The European Union and its Global Partners”, in 
Who is a Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The European Union and its Global Partners, Centre for 
European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008, pp. 1-23.    
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The quality of its results and its added value for European citizens and member states will be the 
tool to measure its legitimacy; it means its ability to improve the EU role in the international 
landscape, and a foreign policy more coherent and efficient
31. 
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